| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3334 |
| DP3334 The Macroeconomics of Labour and Credit Market Imperfections | |
| Philippe Weil; Etienne Wasmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-22 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. An individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive, will carry out decisions. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust mechanism is defined as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Collective choice Incomplete information Mechanism design Representative democracy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3334 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Weil,Etienne Wasmer. DP3334 The Macroeconomics of Labour and Credit Market Imperfections. 2002. |
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