| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3395 |
| DP3395 Government Leadership and Central Bank Design | |
| Andrew Hughes Hallett; Diana Weymark | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the effects of insider trading on real investment and welfare, and the consequences of different regulatory policies: a disclose-or-abstain rule, ?fair? disclosure, laissez-faire and forbidding insider trades based on ?precise? information. We perform the analysis in a model in which all traders are rational expected-utility maximizers and aware of their position in the market. We compare the equilibrium with insider trading with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading in two scenarios: costly and costless information acquisition. We find that with costly information acquisition an abstain-or-disclose rule tends to be optimal while with free information acquisition laissez-faire is better. This suggests enforcing an abstain-or-disclose rule with a high standard of proof for inside information. This rule of thumb advocates a laissez policy both for selective disclosure and in high-tech industries. Our approach uncovers the pitfalls of welfare analysis in the noise trader model. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Insider trading selective disclosure Disclose-or-abstain rule Real investment Welfare Hedging Speculation Noise traders |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3395 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532417 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Hughes Hallett,Diana Weymark. DP3395 Government Leadership and Central Bank Design. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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