| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3403 |
| DP3403 An Evaluation Framework for Alternative VaR Models | |
| Christian Wolff; Dennis Bams; Thorsten Lehnert | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The allocation of control rights in a venture does not matter if partners have congruent preferences. This Paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence, and applies it to the structure of alliances between a privately informed ?entrepreneur? (technology firm) and an ?investor? (large corporation). Investor control increases when the entrepreneur is better informed or when the information that the investor receives during the course of the venture is more noisy. More investor control, however, often results in less investor interference, since the investor puts more trust in the entrepreneur upon receiving more control and, hence, has a tendency to neglect ambiguous information ex post. As a result, the cost of signaling is endogenous and the quality of the post-contracting information constrains the amount of pre-contracting information that can be revealed. Our results are in line with empirical findings on control rights in biotechnology alliances and venture capital contracts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Control rights Venture capital Authority Asymmetric information Biotechnology alliances |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3403 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532425 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Wolff,Dennis Bams,Thorsten Lehnert. DP3403 An Evaluation Framework for Alternative VaR Models. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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