G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3403
DP3403 An Evaluation Framework for Alternative VaR Models
Christian Wolff; Dennis Bams; Thorsten Lehnert
发表日期2002-06-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要The allocation of control rights in a venture does not matter if partners have congruent preferences. This Paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence, and applies it to the structure of alliances between a privately informed ?entrepreneur? (technology firm) and an ?investor? (large corporation). Investor control increases when the entrepreneur is better informed or when the information that the investor receives during the course of the venture is more noisy. More investor control, however, often results in less investor interference, since the investor puts more trust in the entrepreneur upon receiving more control and, hence, has a tendency to neglect ambiguous information ex post. As a result, the cost of signaling is endogenous and the quality of the post-contracting information constrains the amount of pre-contracting information that can be revealed. Our results are in line with empirical findings on control rights in biotechnology alliances and venture capital contracts.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Control rights Venture capital Authority Asymmetric information Biotechnology alliances
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3403
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532425
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Christian Wolff,Dennis Bams,Thorsten Lehnert. DP3403 An Evaluation Framework for Alternative VaR Models. 2002.
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