| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3407 |
| DP3407 Intra-national versus International Trade in the European Union: Why do National Borders Matter? | |
| Natalie Chen | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much; (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path; (3) resource booms, however, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy and (4) the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions, since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with good institutions tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions mitigate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries with bad institutions suffer a resource curse. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Natural resources Political economy Clientelism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3407 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532429 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Natalie Chen. DP3407 Intra-national versus International Trade in the European Union: Why do National Borders Matter?. 2002. |
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