| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3422 |
| DP3422 Political Foundations of the Resource Curse | |
| Thierry Verdier; James Robinson; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these optimal reaction functions and instrument rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs well on both counts. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Commitment Interest rate setting Adaptive learning Stability determinacy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3422 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532441 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,James Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. DP3422 Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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