| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3428 |
| DP3428 Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information | |
| Anke Kessler; Christoph Lülfesmann; Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing, there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated. We develop a general-equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues. We highlight two failures of the laissez-faire outcome: there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante, and too much production diversification ex post. Optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions: to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante, but to rationalize production ex post. We provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Industrial policy Development |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3428 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532447 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anke Kessler,Christoph Lülfesmann,Patrick W. Schmitz. DP3428 Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
