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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP3429 |
DP3429 Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups | |
Bruno Cassiman; Masako Ueda | |
发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
出版年 | 2002 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This Paper studies the optimal education policy in the presence of different groups of households, with groups differing in the distribution of the ability to benefit from education. The main result is that the high ability individuals from groups with relatively few high ability individuals should receive more education than equally able individuals from groups with a more favourable distribution of abilities. The interpretation of this conclusion is that affirmative action policies can find a rationale on efficiency grounds alone. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Affirmative action Education policy Minorities |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3429 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532448 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Cassiman,Masako Ueda. DP3429 Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups. 2002. |
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