G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3429
DP3429 Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups
Bruno Cassiman; Masako Ueda
发表日期2002-06-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要This Paper studies the optimal education policy in the presence of different groups of households, with groups differing in the distribution of the ability to benefit from education. The main result is that the high ability individuals from groups with relatively few high ability individuals should receive more education than equally able individuals from groups with a more favourable distribution of abilities. The interpretation of this conclusion is that affirmative action policies can find a rationale on efficiency grounds alone.
主题Public Economics
关键词Affirmative action Education policy Minorities
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3429
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532448
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bruno Cassiman,Masako Ueda. DP3429 Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups. 2002.
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