| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3439 |
| DP3439 Assessing the Political Sustainability of Parametric Social Security Reforms: The Case of Italy | |
| Vincenzo Galasso; Marcello D'Amato | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk-averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation to smooth consumption during employment without causing moral hazard. A pre-announced delay in dismissal when the job becomes unproductive provides further insurance but because of moral hazard it does not fully smooth consumption. During the delay consumption falls and the worker searches for another job. No delays in dismissals are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Unemployment risk Employment risk Severence compensation Notice of dismissal |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3439 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532458 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincenzo Galasso,Marcello D'Amato. DP3439 Assessing the Political Sustainability of Parametric Social Security Reforms: The Case of Italy. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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