| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3450 |
| DP3450 Market and Technical Risk in R&D | |
| Konrad O Stahl; Heiko A. Gerlach; Thomas Rønde | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. I argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain control in order to avoid undue interference. Hence, I predict that risky claims should be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that control should always be attached to more equity-like claims, and is in line with contractual terms used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnerships between biotech start-ups and large corporations. The Paper also rationalizes the evidence, documented in Gompers (1999) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), that venture capital contracts include contingencies triggering both a reduction in VC control and the conversion of VC's preferred stock into common stock. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Venture capital Control rights Security design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3450 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532468 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konrad O Stahl,Heiko A. Gerlach,Thomas Rønde. DP3450 Market and Technical Risk in R&D. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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