| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3457 |
| DP3457 An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Gilles Chemla; Michel Habib | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Assortative matching Principal agent Contract theory |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3457 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532475 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Gilles Chemla,Michel Habib. DP3457 An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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