| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3460 |
| DP3460 Relational Contracts and Property Rights | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Matthias Blonski | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoretical literature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. The reason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a counterveiling fall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in the context of a stochastic model of the labor market, an increase in insider wages promotes firing in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Employment Wages Insiders Business cycles Hiring and firing costs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3460 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532478 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Matthias Blonski. DP3460 Relational Contracts and Property Rights. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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