| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3462 |
| DP3462 Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control? | |
| [unavailable] | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and by an advisor to improve the productivity of an investment project. Without moral hazard, it is optimal that both exert effort. With moral hazard, if the entrepreneur's effort is more efficient (less costly) than the advisor's effort, the latter is not hired if she does not provide funds. Outside financing arises endogenously. This paper thus provides a theory for why investors like venture capitalists are value enhancing. The optimal amount of outside financing is determined. Last, it is optimal to issue common stocks when the level of outside financing is not too large, while it is optimal to issue convertible bonds when the outside financing is large. These results are consistent with empirical evidence on venture capital. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Venture capital Outside finance Convertible bonds Double moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3462 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532480 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [unavailable]. DP3462 Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?. 2002. |
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