全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP3466 A Matching Model of Crowding-Out and On-the-Job Search (with an Application to Spain)

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP3466
	DP3466 A Matching Model of Crowding-Out and On-the-Job Search (with an Application to Spain)
	Juan Dolado; Juan Francisco Jimeno; Marcel Jansen
发表日期	2002-07-20
出版年	2002
语种	英语
摘要	We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in counteracting costly shareholder risk-shifting incentives during severe financial distress, when job-loss may be imminent. We examine this argument empirically using bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where a filing automatically terminates CEO employment and requires the firm to be sold in an open auction. The median CEO income loss is a dramatic 40%, suggesting that bankruptcy filing damages CEO reputation. Empirical proxies for both CEO reputation and control benefits are significant determinants of the probability of the CEO being rehired by the buyer in the auction, as predicted. Moreover, we find that the rehired CEOs generate a post-bankruptcy accounting performance at par with industry rivals. The surprisingly strong survival characteristics of the reorganized firms are consistent with managerial conservatism ex ante, and help alleviate creditor concern with costly asset substitution designed to delay filing in an automatic bankruptcy auction system.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Post-bankruptcy performance Ceo turnover Bankruptcy Executive compensation Private benefits of control Risk-shifting incentives
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp3466
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532484
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Juan Dolado,Juan Francisco Jimeno,Marcel Jansen. DP3466 A Matching Model of Crowding-Out and On-the-Job Search (with an Application to Spain). 2002.