| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3468
|
| DP3468 Does Poaching Distort Training? |
| Espen R. Moen; Åsa Rosén
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-07-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Voting Theory generally concludes that, in first-past-the-post elections, all votes should go to effective candidates (Duverger?s Law), and parties should adopt a similar platform (Median Voter Theorem). Such predictions are not always met in practice, however. We show why divergence and vote dispersion is a natural outcome when (i) parties are opportunistic, (ii) there is uncertainty on the position of the median voter and (iii) elections are repeated. ?Voting for losers? increases the informational content of elections, and may induce mainstream parties to relocate towards extremists. As a result, to maximize their probability of being elected, they do not adopt median platforms, but instead diverge to a certain extent. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Voting
Signalling
Duverger's law
Poisson games
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3468
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532486
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Espen R. Moen,Åsa Rosén. DP3468 Does Poaching Distort Training?. 2002.
|
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