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来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3485
DP3485 Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Investment?
David Greenaway; Holger Görg
发表日期2002-08-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要Agency problems are an important determinant of corporate liquidity. For a sample of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries, we find that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in countries with good shareholder protection. In addition, when shareholder protection is poor, factors that generally drive the need for liquidity, such as investment opportunities and asymmetric information, actually become less important. These results strengthen after controlling for capital market development. In fact, consistent with the importance of agency costs, we find that managers actually hold larger cash balances when capital markets are better developed. Our evidence indicates that investors in countries with poor shareholder protection cannot force managers to disgorge excessive cash balances.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Corporate liquidity Cash holdings Shareholder rights
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3485
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532501
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
David Greenaway,Holger Görg. DP3485 Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Investment?. 2002.
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