| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3488 |
| DP3488 Donations | |
| Francesca Cornelli; Andrea Buraschi | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers, some consumers are price sensitive, and the entrant is charged an access fee for entering the network. We distinguish between classical (de novo) entry and reciprocal entry (incumbent entering the neighbouring market), and analyse how such public policy measures as (i) publication of prices by the authorities and (ii) lower access fees affect the competitive outcome. In the reciprocal entry model we find that lower access fees tend to discourage entry into a neighbouring market, while the publishing of prices has an ambiguous effect on entry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Collusion Entry Access fee Telecommunication |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3488 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532504 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesca Cornelli,Andrea Buraschi. DP3488 Donations. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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