G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3488
DP3488 Donations
Francesca Cornelli; Andrea Buraschi
发表日期2002-08-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers, some consumers are price sensitive, and the entrant is charged an access fee for entering the network. We distinguish between classical (de novo) entry and reciprocal entry (incumbent entering the neighbouring market), and analyse how such public policy measures as (i) publication of prices by the authorities and (ii) lower access fees affect the competitive outcome. In the reciprocal entry model we find that lower access fees tend to discourage entry into a neighbouring market, while the publishing of prices has an ambiguous effect on entry.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Collusion Entry Access fee Telecommunication
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3488
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532504
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Francesca Cornelli,Andrea Buraschi. DP3488 Donations. 2002.
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