| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3498
|
| DP3498 Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States |
| Tim Besley; Anne Case
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-08-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of firm-level bargaining, along the lines of Manning (1993). In this context, we provide a firm level wage equation that explicitly accounts for firm heterogeneity. This wage equation explains inter-firm wage differentials by differences in labour productivity and job turnover. More precisely, our model predicts that the higher the rate of job destruction within one firm, the higher the compensation of workers. We estimate our wage equation using matched employer-employee panel data in the manufacturing sector, where firms are tracked for five years, between 1988-92. The empirical estimates, using GMM techniques, are fully consistent with our theoretical prediction of equalizing differences: workers who take into account their intertemporal discounted income will support lower wages when they benefit from lower unemployment risks within their firm. In our model, wages are set to maximize a Nash bargain criterion, and according to the estimators used or the industry we consider, we show that workers have an average bargaining power between 0.15 and 0.25, measured on a scale going from 0 to 1. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Union behaviour
Bargaining power
Inter-firm wage differentials
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3498
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532512
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Tim Besley,Anne Case. DP3498 Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States. 2002.
|
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