| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3510 |
| DP3510 Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms | |
| Pierre Cahuc; Dominique Goux; Christian Gianella; Andre Zylberberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country?s own circumstances, but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little ?policy experimentation?. Corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently. Our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation, corruption, and economic performance as a function of a country?s location vis-à-vis successful leaders. In particular, it predicts a U-shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics: close neighbors should do very well, distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance, and intermediate countries worst of all. An empirical test with the experience of post-socialist countries provides supportive results. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Institutions Economic growth Convergence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3510 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532524 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Cahuc,Dominique Goux,Christian Gianella,et al. DP3510 Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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