G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3510
DP3510 Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms
Pierre Cahuc; Dominique Goux; Christian Gianella; Andre Zylberberg
发表日期2002-08-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要We consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country?s own circumstances, but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little ?policy experimentation?. Corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently. Our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation, corruption, and economic performance as a function of a country?s location vis-à-vis successful leaders. In particular, it predicts a U-shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics: close neighbors should do very well, distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance, and intermediate countries worst of all. An empirical test with the experience of post-socialist countries provides supportive results.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Institutions Economic growth Convergence
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3510
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532524
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pierre Cahuc,Dominique Goux,Christian Gianella,et al. DP3510 Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms. 2002.
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