| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3518 |
| DP3518 Understanding Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility | |
| Philip Lane; Michael B Devereux | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies a monopolist selling tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal. More surprisingly, the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale despite the fact that consumers are willing to pay more when they can resell tickets. I discuss the implications of the model for the pricing practices observed in ticket markets. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Ticket pricing Resale Price discrimination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3518 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philip Lane,Michael B Devereux. DP3518 Understanding Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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