| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3547 |
| DP3547 Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives | |
| Christian Wey; Roman Inderst | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country?s best interests to undertake the reform program. It is argued that heterogeneity of interests must form the basis of any discussion of conditionality and ownership. The Paper stresses a conflict between a reformist government and domestic interest groups that oppose reform, leading to a distinction between government and country ownership of a program. A model of lending and policy reform is presented that illustrates the effects of unconditional and conditional assistance first without and then with political constraints. It is shown that conditionality can play a key role even when the Fund and authorities agree on the goals of an assistance program. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Imf Foreign aid Conditionality Ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3547 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532556 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Wey,Roman Inderst. DP3547 Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives. 2002. |
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