| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3554 |
| DP3554 A Simple Second-Order Solution Method For Dynamic General Equilibrium Models | |
| Alan Sutherland | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a non-debt simple contract achieves efficiency -- the non-contractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the non-contractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity-like claims. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Renegotiation Convertible debt Capital structure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3554 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532562 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Sutherland. DP3554 A Simple Second-Order Solution Method For Dynamic General Equilibrium Models. 2002. |
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