| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3573 |
| DP3573 Financial Sector Competition, Services Trade, and Growth | |
| Joseph Francois | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal federalism Economic models of political processes Contests Intergovernmental relations Interjurisdictional differentials and their effects |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3573 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532580 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph Francois. DP3573 Financial Sector Competition, Services Trade, and Growth. 2002. |
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