| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3614 |
| DP3614 Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations | |
| Franck Malherbet; Olivier L'Haridon | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This Paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The Paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Wto Dispute settlement Compensation Retaliation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3614 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532619 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Franck Malherbet,Olivier L'Haridon. DP3614 Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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