| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3473 |
| DP3473 Endogenous Political Institutions | |
| Alberto Alesina; Philippe Aghion; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyse both 'optimal' constitutional design and 'positive' aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications, which we then discuss. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political systems Endogenous constitutions Super-majority rule |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3473 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532626 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Philippe Aghion,Francesco Trebbi. DP3473 Endogenous Political Institutions. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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