| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3637 |
| DP3637 Financial Crises, Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility; A Second-Generation Model of Currency Crises | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Benedikt Goderis | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a 'poison pill' through generous long-term labour contracts and thereby reduce the firm?s attractiveness to a raider. Second, employees act as 'white squires' for the incumbent managers: to protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers, by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model is consistent with available empirical findings, and also yields new predictions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate control Private benefits Takeovers Esops Employment protection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3637 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532645 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Benedikt Goderis. DP3637 Financial Crises, Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility; A Second-Generation Model of Currency Crises. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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