| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3650 |
| DP3650 Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard | |
| Pierre-André Chiappori; Alberto Bennardo | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, while many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of other stores, and the effort of the developer to attract customers to the mall. Using a unique dataset of mall tenant contracts, we show that rental contracts are written to: (i) efficiently price the net externality of each store, and (ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the developer and each mall store according to the externality of each store?s effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contracts Externalities Incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3650 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532658 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre-André Chiappori,Alberto Bennardo. DP3650 Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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