| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3668 |
| DP3668 Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance | |
| Mark Gradstein; Tomer Blumkin | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a competitive search model where firms with vacancies choose between posting a wage ex-ante and bargaining it with workers ex-post. Workers apply for vacancies after observing firms' wage setting decisions, and differ in some observable but not verifiable qualifications that affect their productivity in the job. Thus posted wages prevent the hold-up problem associated with bargaining but are incomplete since they cannot be contingent on worker qualifications. In contrast, bargained wages increase with qualifications and, thus, may serve to entice better workers into the vacancy. We find that when the hold-up problem is mild and workers' heterogeneity is large, firms opt for bargaining. Yet equilibria with bargaining always fail to maximize aggregate net income and sometimes fail to be constrained Pareto optimal. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Search frictions Bargaining Directed search Adverse selection Wage inequality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3668 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532674 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Gradstein,Tomer Blumkin. DP3668 Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance. 2002. |
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