| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3674 |
| DP3674 Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty | |
| Peter Zemsky; Goncalo Pacheco de Almeida | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper considers the 'failing firm defence'. Under this principle, found in most antitrust jurisdictions, a merger that would otherwise be blocked due to its adverse effect on competition is permitted when the firm to be acquired is a failing firm, and an alternative, less detrimental merger is unavailable. Competition authorities have shown considerable reluctance to accept the failing firm defence, and it has been successfully used in just a handful of cases. The Paper considers the defence in a dynamic setting with uncertainty. A firm entering a market also considers its ease of exit, foreseeing that it may later wish to leave should market conditions deteriorate. By facilitating exit in times of financial distress, the failing firm defence may encourage entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. This view of the defence has several implications relevant to a number of merger cases. The conditions under which greater leniency is welfare-improving are examined. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Merger policy Failing firm defence Entry Exit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3674 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532679 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Zemsky,Goncalo Pacheco de Almeida. DP3674 Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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