| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3676 |
| DP3676 Liquidity Supply and Demand in Limit Order Markets | |
| Burton Hollifield; Patrik Sandås; Robert A. Miller; Joshua Slive | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice, the optimal sanctions are the offender's entire wealth for the first crime, and zero for the second. Then we ask whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred? If the benefit and/or the harm from the crime are not too large, this is indeed the case; otherwise, equal sanctions for both crimes are optimal. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Crime and punishment Repeat offenders Subgame perfection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3676 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532681 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Burton Hollifield,Patrik Sandås,Robert A. Miller,et al. DP3676 Liquidity Supply and Demand in Limit Order Markets. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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