| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3717 |
| DP3717 Judging Fund Managers by the Company They Keep | |
| Joshua Coval; Luboš Pástor; Randolph Cohen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop an economic theory of ?flexibility?, which we interpret as the discretion or ability to make a decision that others disagree with. We show that flexibility is essentially an option for the decision-maker, and can be valued as such. The value of the flexibility option is decreasing in the extent to which the decision-maker?s future decision-relevant opinion is correlated with the opinions of others who may be able to impede the decision. We argue that flexibility drives economic decisions in a significant way. The applications we consider are: the entrepreneur?s choice of flexibility in the initial mix of financing raised; the use of flexibility to understand differences in security design and the firm?s security-issuance decision; the impact of flexibility on the use of collateral in lending; the role of flexibility in capital budgeting decisions; the effect of flexibility considerations in the design of contracts in a principal-agent setting; the interpretation of ?power? and conformity in organizations in the context of flexibility; and the choice between private and public ownership in the context of flexibility. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate finance Managerial decision-making |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3717 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532692 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Coval,Luboš Pástor,Randolph Cohen. DP3717 Judging Fund Managers by the Company They Keep. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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