| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| 来源ID | DP3729
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| DP3729 Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures |
| Marcus Miller; Sayantan Ghosal
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| 发表日期 | 2003-02-01
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The Paper draws its motivation from the observation that, three years into the single currency, EMU financial markets are making only slow progress towards integration and from the belief that economic history can offer useful insight as to the causes of the phenomenon. In this vein, we investigate a previous case of financial market integration in the wake of monetary unification, that of Italy after 1862.
We find that the prices of the Rendita Italiana 5% (Italian Consols) across regional stock exchanges did not fully converge until 1887, twenty five years after the creation of a ?monetary union? in the peninsula. Regression analysis shows that variables such as the spread of ICT, trade volumes and the diffusion of the ?single currency? fail to explain the delay in financial market unification.
We argue that markets remained relatively fragmented because local vested interests resisted the legal and regulatory changes needed to make arbitrage across individual stock exchanges efficient.
A single Italian financial market appeared only when the State imposed more uniform financial market legislation nationwide, a fact that the EU should perhaps not overlook. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
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| 关键词 | Monetary union
Financial market integration
Vested interests
Nineteenth-century italy
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| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3729
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532732
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marcus Miller,Sayantan Ghosal. DP3729 Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures. 2003.
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