| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3736 |
| DP3736 Working-Time Regulation, Firm Heterogeneity, and Efficiency | |
| Javier Ortega | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. In this Paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Regulation Wage bargaining |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3736 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532742 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Javier Ortega. DP3736 Working-Time Regulation, Firm Heterogeneity, and Efficiency. 2003. |
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