| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3742 |
| DP3742 Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture | |
| Marc Flandreau | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor?s incentives leads to excessive ?rollover failure? by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures, involving ?contractibility? of sovereign debtor?s payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a ?discovery? phase and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is more akin to the IMF?s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective Action Clauses which some promote as an alternative. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | International financial architecture Sovereign debt restructuring Creditor coordination Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3742 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532748 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Flandreau. DP3742 Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture. 2003. |
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