| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3748 |
| DP3748 Regulation with Wage Bargaining | |
| Nils-Henrik M. Von der Fehr; Espen R. Moen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies kinship-band networks as capital market institutions. It explores two of the channels through which membership in a community where individuals are genealogically linked, such as a kin group, can affect their access to informal credit. The first is that incentives to default are lower for community members who can expect retaliation to fall on their offspring as well as on themselves (social enforcement). The second is that lenders prefer to lend to those members from whom they can expect reciprocation in the form of future loans for themselves or for their children (reciprocity). The possibility to engage in reciprocal transactions affects the terms of the loans in nontrivial ways. The social enforcement and reciprocity effects are incorporated in an overlapping generations repayment game with endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers, and are tested using household-level data from Ghana. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Kinship Reciprocity Social norm Informal credit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3748 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532754 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nils-Henrik M. Von der Fehr,Espen R. Moen. DP3748 Regulation with Wage Bargaining. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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