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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP3753 |
DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions | |
Roel Beetsma; Lans Bovenberg | |
发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
出版年 | 2003 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the world, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision-making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy?s saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Family firms Financial development Productivity Growth |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3753 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532759 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Lans Bovenberg. DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions. 2003. |
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