| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3753 |
| DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions | |
| Roel Beetsma; Lans Bovenberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the world, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision-making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy?s saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Family firms Financial development Productivity Growth |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532759 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Lans Bovenberg. DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roel Beetsma]的文章 |
| [Lans Bovenberg]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roel Beetsma]的文章 |
| [Lans Bovenberg]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roel Beetsma]的文章 |
| [Lans Bovenberg]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
