G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3753
DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions
Roel Beetsma; Lans Bovenberg
发表日期2003-02-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the world, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision-making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy?s saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity.
主题Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics
关键词Family firms Financial development Productivity Growth
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3753
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532759
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roel Beetsma,Lans Bovenberg. DP3753 Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions. 2003.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Roel Beetsma]的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Roel Beetsma]的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Roel Beetsma]的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。