| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3759 |
| DP3759 Common Vulnerabilities | |
| Mark Taylor; Ashoka Mody | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider two sellers each of whom has one unit of an indivisible good and two buyers each of whom is interested in buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second price auctions as rationing device. An equilibrium in pure strategies where each sellers has a regular customer is characterized. The result is applied in order to demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second price auctions may enhance total surplus. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Duopoly Selling mechanisms Private information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3759 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Taylor,Ashoka Mody. DP3759 Common Vulnerabilities. 2003. |
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