| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3773 |
| DP3773 Capital-Skill Complementarity and the Redistributive Effects of Social Security Reform | |
| Alessandra Casarico; Carlo Devillanova | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers? output but not their effort, and in which a worker?s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn create unemployment. We show that the socially efficient incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained in the absence of unemployment benefits. We then apply the model to explain the recent increase in performance-pay contracts. Within our model, this can be explained by three different factors: (i) increased importance of non-observable effort, (ii) a fall in the marginal tax rate, (iii) a reduction in the heterogeneity of workers performing the same task. The likely effect of all three factors is an increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Incentives Contracts Unemployment Efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3773 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532776 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casarico,Carlo Devillanova. DP3773 Capital-Skill Complementarity and the Redistributive Effects of Social Security Reform. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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