| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3784
|
| DP3784 Delay in Contests |
| Helmut Bester; Kai Konrad
|
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-23
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyse an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations compete on criminal activities and engage in corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. When bribing costs are low - that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers working in a weak governance environment - and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is non-monotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads to higher rather than lower crime. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Deterrence
Organized crime
Corruption
Strategic complements
Oligopoly
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3784
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532783
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Helmut Bester,Kai Konrad. DP3784 Delay in Contests. 2003.
|
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