| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3810 |
| DP3810 Efficient Unemployment Insurance Time Path | |
| Eran Yashiv; Yossi Hadar; Tomer Blumkin | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Employment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms? hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on workers behaviour. The goal of this Paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of employment protection induces more absenteeism among workers. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white-collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of day?s absence per week more than doubles once employment protection is granted. This result offers a preliminary but robust piece of evidence to evaluate a consequence of employment protection systems that has been relatively neglected in the policy debate in Europe. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Probation Employment protection Absenteeism Worker effort |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3810 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532802 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eran Yashiv,Yossi Hadar,Tomer Blumkin. DP3810 Efficient Unemployment Insurance Time Path. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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