| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3851 |
| DP3851 Regulation and Investment | |
| Alberto Alesina; Fabio Schiantarelli; Silvia Ardagna; Giorgio Nicoletti | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a framework for analysing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms? types. We introduce the concepts of essentially monotone decreasing (EMD) and increasing (EMI) functions, which generalize the respective mono-tonicity properties. If the profit differential between post-merger and pre-merger profits satisfies EMD, low-state firms gain more than high-state firms from mergers in expectation. Using this result, we characterize the equilibria of merger games with simultaneous and sequential moves. The application of our framework to specific oligopoly models illustrates that the introduction of two-sided asymmetric information may lead to considerable changes in the predicted merger pattern. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Merger Asymmetric information Oligopoly Single crossing Essentially monotone decreasing functions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3851 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532833 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Fabio Schiantarelli,Silvia Ardagna,et al. DP3851 Regulation and Investment. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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