| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3852 |
| DP3852 Optimal Financial Market Integration and Security Design | |
| Alberto Bisin; Viral Acharya | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority?s decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Lobbying Rent seeking Asymmetric information Disclosure Efficiency gains Antitrust |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3852 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532834 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Bisin,Viral Acharya. DP3852 Optimal Financial Market Integration and Security Design. 2003. |
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