| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3907 |
| DP3907 Delegated Job Design | |
| Hans K. Hvide; Todd Kaplan | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-04-22 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the compatibility decisions of two regional monopolistic suppliers of a network-effect good who first build up installed bases in their respective home region and then compete in a third market. We show that with weak network effects, installed home bases always are higher under compatibility and suppliers always opt for compatibility. With strong network effects, home markets are covered, and given a sufficiently high home-market size advantage both the favoured supplier and a regional standardization body maintain incompatibility in order (to enable the supplier) to monopolize the third market via limit pricing. As incompatibility always results in a welfare loss, this is a strong case for a global standardization body. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Compatibility decisions Installed home base International network effects Third-market competition Standardization bodies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3907 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532840 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans K. Hvide,Todd Kaplan. DP3907 Delegated Job Design. 2003. |
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