| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3856 |
| DP3856 Prisoners' Other Dilemma | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Matthias Blonski | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide where to locate. Firms choose to locate either in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments or in one without adjustment costs. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty it is demonstrated that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. We show that the strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with adjustment costs while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Uncertainty Flexibility Oligopoly Employment protection Foreign direct investment Location |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3856 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532843 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Matthias Blonski. DP3856 Prisoners' Other Dilemma. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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