| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3866 |
| DP3866 Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing | |
| Marco Celentani; Klaus Desmet; José Ignacio Conde-Ruiz | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Merger policy Repeated games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3866 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532850 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Celentani,Klaus Desmet,José Ignacio Conde-Ruiz. DP3866 Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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