| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3869 |
| DP3869 Deflation: Prevention and Cure | |
| Willem Buiter | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more efficient allocation of talent inside the firm, but at the cost that low-ability workers must be compensated to be willing to self-sort. Career concerns put a limit to the efficiency of delegation: when market observability of job content is high, the compensation needed to get low ability workers to self-sort is high, and firms limit delegation to avoid cream-skimming of the high-ability workers. We investigate implications of the theory for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur and to the design optimal incentive contracts. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Career concerns Delegation Discretion Peter principle Sun hydraulics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3869 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532853 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Willem Buiter. DP3869 Deflation: Prevention and Cure. 2003. |
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