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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP3861 |
DP3861 How Large are Search Frictions? | |
Coen N. Teulings; Pieter A. Gautier | |
发表日期 | 2003-04-24 |
出版年 | 2003 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyse risk-sharing and endogenous fiscal spending in a two-region model with sequentially complete markets. Fiscal policy is determined by majority voting. When policy setting is decentralized, regions choose pro-cyclical fiscal spending in an attempt to manipulate security prices to their benefit. This leads to incomplete risk-sharing, despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregate risk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, security prices can no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regions are relatively homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscal union. If they are relatively heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich region prefers the decentralized setting. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Endogenous policy Complete markets Efficiency Risk-sharing |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3861 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532867 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Coen N. Teulings,Pieter A. Gautier. DP3861 How Large are Search Frictions?. 2003. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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