G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3884
DP3884 Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?
Johan Lagerlof
发表日期2003-05-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要Collusive agreements and relational contracts are commonly modeled as equilibria of dynamic games with the strategic features of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The pay-offs agents obtain when being ?cheated upon? by other agents play no role in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma is often implausible: for a significant subset of the pay-off discount factor parameter space, all cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We derive an easy-to-calculate critical level for the discount factor below which this happens, also function of pay-offs obtained when others defect, and argue it is a better measure for the ?likelihood? of cooperation than the critical level at which cooperation is supportable in equilibrium. Our results apply to other games sharing the strategic structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma (repeated oligopolies, relational-contracting models, etc.). We illustrate our main result for collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Cooperation Collusion Repeated games Relational contracts Risk dominance Cartel stability Strategic risk
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3884
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532871
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Johan Lagerlof. DP3884 Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?. 2003.
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