| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3886 |
| DP3886 Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information | |
| Wilfried Sand-Zantman; Georges Casamatta | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. When the latter kind of information is available, the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori. This conformist behaviour hurts the principal in two ways: the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one (discipline) and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent's ability (sorting). The Paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which transparency on action is detrimental to the principal. The Paper also shows the existence of complementarities between transparency on action and transparency on consequence. The results on the distinction between transparency on action and transparency on consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in politics, corporate governance, and delegated portfolio management. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | transparency Disclosure Expert agents |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3886 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532873 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wilfried Sand-Zantman,Georges Casamatta. DP3886 Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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