| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3911 |
| DP3911 Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries | |
| Anke Kessler | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral competition Plurality rule Proportional system |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3911 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532883 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anke Kessler. DP3911 Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries. 2003. |
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