| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3904 |
| DP3904 On the Trend Recognition and Forecasting Ability of Professional Traders | |
| Martin Weber; Markus Glaser; Thomas Langer | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-25 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as labour rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, labour and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests can lead the political majority to support bank over equity dominance. As share-holdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will move towards favoring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Bank centered system Social insurance Political economy Median voter Corporate investment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3904 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532900 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Weber,Markus Glaser,Thomas Langer. DP3904 On the Trend Recognition and Forecasting Ability of Professional Traders. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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